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Abstract - In our modern societies, socio-technological 
systems and human system interactions are taking on a 
large part in numerous domains such as health, control of 
risk, people safety, communication, information 
technologies, and so on. In order to manage such 
systems, it is necessary to put in place the most relevant 
actions and indicators. To facilitate decision making in 
various fields, such as people safety and risk 
management, the use of appropriate model and the 
definition of indicators are needed in order to deliver the 
relevant action plan especially to control occupational 
accidents.  
 
The aim of the article is to present our approach to 
analyze WKH FODVVLFDO +HLQULFK¶V PRGHO of occupational 
accidents and the classical safety indicator based on 
conventional frequency rate of lost time accident. Then 
we demonstrate their limits in order to define efficient 
prevention strategies. 
Keywords: Accident modeling, safety indicator, 
prevention, complex system, risk management. 
1 ,QWURGXFWLRQ 
Statistics from International Labor Organization and 
Worldwide Health Organization [1] put in evidence that 
2 million occupational fatalities occur each year 
worldwide (e.g. around 1 fatality every 20 seconds) 
divided in 1.7 million due to occupational diseases and 
0.3 million due to occupational accidents (plus 268 
million lost time accidents  more than 3 days out of 
work). To compare with, there were 2 million killed 
soldiers each year during the First World War that is to 
say as many as killed workers each year worldwide. 
Furthermore, to compare with these 2 000 000 fatalities 
we can remind other worldwide figures: x 999 000 fatalities on the road (~ 1 million). x 563 000 fatalities due to violence (~ 1/2 million). x 502 000 fatalities due to war (~ 1/2 million). x 312 000 fatalities due to VIH/Aids (~ 1/3 million). 
Beyond all human and ethical issues, the economic 
impact of fatalities at work, estimated to 1 250 billion 
dollars (e.g. 4 % of worldwide GNP
1
), is quite huge. 
Behind global figures, we can find several situations 
worldwide. For instance, occupational fatalities are 
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 Gross National Product 
around: 5 500 in the USA, 100 000 in China, 6 000 in 
Russia and 40 000 in South America. It is still far too 
much. In order to prevent occupational accidents, most 
companies throughout the world are using prevention 
strategies. These strategies are based on model of 
accident [2] and safety indicator [3]. 
 
2 0RGHORIDFFLGHQWDQG6DIHW\
LQGLFDWRU 
Companies, that want to prevent accidents, often 
implement action plans based on Heinrich model and 
safety indicator referring to conventional frequency rate. 
2.1 The Heinrich model of accident 
Companies often use the Heinrich model whatever 
their activities. From 1930, in the occupational accidents 
prevention framework, the founding works of Heinrich 
[4] are often cited to illustrate a linear relationship 
between indicators, such as the accident frequency and 
accident gravity rates.  
On 5 000 cases analyzed, Heinrich considered that a total 
of 330 accidents could divide into three categories: 1 
major injury, 29 minor injuries and 300 nearmiss 
incidents. The relation 1-29-300 is often represented as a 
pyramid (Figure 1). Heinrich specified the scope and the 
limits of its study. In its book « Industrial accident 
prevention » McGraw-Hill 1959 (4
th
 edition), Heinrich 
wrote at chapter « How the 300-29-1 Ratio Was 
determined »:  «The determination of this no-injury 
accident frequency followed a study of over 5000 cases. 
The difficulties can readily be imagined. There were a 
few data existing on minor injuries to say nothing of no-
injury accidents ». 
However, the analyzed activities concerned rather 
«mechanical aspects », corresponding to workshops of 
the time that is in the 1930¶V the stakeholders are directly 
linked (linear aspect) to machines and tools.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 : The Foundation of a Major Injury. 
Source: H. W. Heinrich, Industrial Accident Prevention, 
1950 
 
Heinrich defined the accident as an « uncontrolled 
event » [4]: 
« Accident prevention is both science and art. It 
represents, above all other things, control - control 
of man performance, machine performance, and 
physical environment ». 
 
Consequently, this work should not be « deny », but 
we have to merely revisit our practices according to new 
knowledges in order to apply them to activities whose the 
complexity level is considerably increased over the years.  
We have to act wisely to manage these shifts within 
organizations which are accustomed to use some methods 
of work and analysis.  
 
However, we can ask these questions: this model 
has been studied specifically within mechanical 
ZRUNVKRSV LQ WKH¶V and used, is it suitable for any 
type of organization and activity which currently are 
increasingly often complex ?  
Is it adapted to manage rare events with a major gravity?  
2.2 Safety indicator: conventional frequency 
rate 
The control of prevention strategies often relies 
from Heinrich model on the management of accident 
frequency rate.  
The Heinrich model claims two basic relationships: 
first of all, both severity and frequency are inversely 
related and the second one is reductions in minor injuries 
will contribute in proportionate reductions in major 
injuries.   
Accordingly, the hypothesis is if we work on the 
pyramid basis, any type of major accidents could be 
avoided. This reflection supposes that most accidents 
have common root causes and that minor injuries have 
the same potential to become serious. Thus, by 
preventing minor injuries, we will prevent serious 
injuries. 
Nevertheless, this hypothesis can be only confirm 
or infirm by knowing the number and the type of 
accidents within an organization. For this, one of used 
indicator is the Conventional Frequency Rate (CFR). 
The Conventional Frequency Rate allows 
measuring the number of lost time accidents over a 
period of time per million worked hours. The CFR is the 
number of lost time accidents over one day over a period 
of 12 months in general, per million worked hours. The 
CFR is defined by the ratio:  
CFR = 
୐୘୅Ǥଵ଴ల୒୛ୌ  
 
With CFR: Conventional Frequency Rate, LTA: number 
of lost time accident and NWH: number of worked hours
2
. 
 
Another indicator is the Severity Rate (SR):  
SR =  
୐ୈǤଵ଴య୒୛ୌ  
 
With LD: number of days lost 
 
Using this indicator is not as simple. It is possible to 
determine the sensitivity factor of CFR versus the size of 
the sample of people (Table 1). The graph on Figure 2 
determines the impact factor of on lost time accident 
when the sample is varying between 1 and 5 000. 
 
Sample Impact factor 
1 613,4969325 
2 306,7484663 
5 122,6993865 
10 61,34969325 
50 12,26993865 
100 6,134969325 
500 1,226993865 
1 000 0,613496933 
5 000 0,122699387 
Table 1: Sensitivity factor versus the size of the sample 
Figure 2: Indicator of result or follow up [3] 
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 The number of worked hours is calculated by 
multiplying the number of workers with the average 
annual working hours of a full time employee. 
The moment when an accident occurs on the time 
horizon (usually 12 months) can also have an impact. Let 
us take an example where a plant has got one accident 
over a 12 months period. If the accident is occurring in 
January: 
 The CFR3 in January is 12 times higher than it will be 
at the end of December. 
 The cumulative CFR will be impacted all the 
yearlong. 
If the accident occurs in December, between 
January and the end of November, the indicator will be 
equal to zero with a « feeling » to control risks. 
In December, the indicator will turn red with the feeling 
that suddenly the situation was worsen, e.g. before the 
accident everything seems ok and after the accident 
everything seems bad. 
2.3 Accident in Texas City Refinery 2005 
march, 23
rd
   
The accident of BP refinery in Texas on March 23
rd
, 
2005 should remain in all memories in order to learn 
lessons of what happened (15 fatalities, 170 severely 
injured, 700 million dollars to the victims, 2.3 million for 
OSHA
4
 safety and hygiene violations, plus the ones 
corresponding to environmental violations). 
BDNHU¶VUHSRUW-DQXDU\>] starts like that: « 
Other companies and their stakeholders can benefit from 
our work. We urge these companies to regularly and 
thoroughly evaluate their safety culture ». Here can be 
highlighted a very classical question: could we expect 
such an accident by meaning of specific indicators? 
%DNHU¶V UHSRUW LQGLFDWHV © 7KH OLWHUDWXUH DOVR VXJJHVWV
and the panel believes that the presence of an effective 
personal safety management system does not ensure the 
presence of an effective process safety management 
system. As discussed elsewhere LQ WKLV UHSRUW %3¶V
personal injury rates were not predictive of process safety 
SHUIRUPDQFHDW%3¶VILYH86UHILQHULHVª7KHUHDUHRWKHU
comments about this topic: « BP has emphasized 
personal safety in recent years and has achieved 
significant improvement in personal safety performance, 
but BP did not emphasize process safety. BP mistakenly 
interpreted improving personal injury rates as an 
indication of acceptable process safety performance at its 
86UHILQHULHV%3¶VUHOLDQFHRQWKLVGDWDFRPELQHGZLWK 
inadequate process safety understanding, created a false 
sense of confidence that BP was properly addressing 
safety risks. The panel further found that process safety 
leadership appeared to have suffered as a result of high 
turnover of refinery plant managers ». 
To reduce occupational accidents, BP had launched 
programmes to improve behavior and risk awareness, 
which were successful to decrease the conventional 
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4
 Occupational Safety and Health Administration ± 
United States 
frequency rate of lost time accident by 70 %. By only 
referring to this indicator, one could feel honestly to 
improve situation [6]. But at the same time: shift 
operators were working more than 30 successive 12 
hours shifts, 8 plant managers were successively hired 
over a period of 6 years on site composed with 1 800 BP 
staff and 2 000 outside workers. In addition to that, 300 
violations were identified on equipments by several 
surveys following the accidents and we can remind that 
the year before the explosion, there were 2 fatalities in 
the refinery (in 2004). 
The question of global coherence is raised.  
%DNHU¶VUHSRUWRWKHUVFDQEHIRXQGHJ0RJIRUG¶V
report, December 9
th
, 2005) puts in evidence some 
important causes: lack of maintenance, lack of process 
safety management and associated expertise. These 
causes are not reported [7] in usual scorecards [8] 
compared to CFR. 
These are prevention strategies after the accident: 
As a consequence and following the conclusions of 
various reports, BP launched several programmes on 
leadership and on process safety management (PSM) and 
planned to invest 1 billion dollars over a 5 years period in 
the refinery. The Group decided to internalize some 
technical activities that had been outsourced during the 
past and to reinforce internal expertise. 
3 +RZWRLPSOHPHQWHIILFLHQW
SUHYHQWLRQVWUDWHJLHV 
Consequently, it is possible to improve CFR year by 
year by working on programme based on behavior and 
awareness, while at the same moment reducing annual 
maintenance or training budget or specific expertise that 
are mandatory for future performance, even for sustained 
business. This point has especially to be taken into 
account when considering manager turnover. A too big 
turnover can introduce strong bias, e.g. to get quick wins 
only compared to long term actions which are 
fundamental. The system of annual objectives must take 
into account those dimensions and must ensure a full 
coherence between short term and long term objectives. 
As for example, ergonomic: to avoid hazardous situations 
that will generate problems in the future (when managers 
will have turned over). Organizations must ensure short 
term and long term coherence: both are important and 
interact.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: &)5YHUVXV'3/7$ 
We can give another example for a big company in 
the business of civil engineering and raw materials. We 
can determine that for a period of 10 years, the duration 
of days lost per lost time accident (DPLTA)
5
 is 
increasing almost continuously from around 30 days to 
100 days while CFR is decreasing continuously (Figure 
3).  
It appears that there are fewer accidents but much 
more severe ones. Based only on CFR, you could 
consider that prevention is improving, but by taking into 
account DPLTA, the prevention is worse. 
Even more if we consider the sustainability reports 
of this company, there is an interesting benchmark with 
other companies working in the same business: 
While this company is improving its score on CFR, 
it is worsening for fatalities (Figure 4). In the same time, 
both CFR and SR
6
 are decreasing, meaning an 
improvement, whereas DPLTA and fatalities are 
increasing, reflecting a worsening (Figure 5).  
Therefore, if each indicator is considered separately, 
the view of the situation is mistaken, since some 
indicators could consider the situation as an improvement 
and others ones as a worsening. Consequently, all 
indicators should be compared in order to put in evidence 
the field reality.   
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 DPLTA = 
ୗୖେ୊ୖǤଵ଴య 
days lost per lost time accident times 1000 e.g. the 
severity of each accident. 
6
 Severity Rate 
Figure 4: CFR versus SR 
 
 
Figure 5: CFR versus SR 
 
There are the ranking results for the frequency rate 
and the severity rate of this company compared to others 
companies working in the same sector for 2006, 2007, 
2008 and 2010: 
x Benchmark/ Sustainability Report 2006 
Frequency rate: 9 companies have published their 
frequency rate of occupational lost-time accident. The 
company is ranked 4
th
. For this indicator, its performance 
has increased in 2006.  
Severity rate: 6 companies have published their 
gravity rate in 2005. The company is ranked 4
th
 and its 
performance has decreased the next year.  
x Benchmark/ Sustainability Report 2007 
Frequency rate: 9 companies have published their 
frequency rate of occupational lost-time accident in 2006. 
The company is ranked second whereas it was 4
th
 the 
previous year.  
Severity rate: 6 companies have published their 
results in 2006. The company comes last in this group.  
Two companies have zero accident. The company is 
continuing to aim this objective. In 2007, its performance 
is increased in this sector.  
 
 
x Benchmark/ Sustainability Report 2008 
Frequency rate: 9 companies have published their 
results for this indicator, and the company is ranked 
second.  
Severity rate: 7 companies have published their 
results in 2007. The company is ranked 6
th
.  
For this year, two companies also showed a gravity 
rate of zero. The company is continuing to tend towards 
this aim and some progress has been made in 2008.  
x  Benchmark/ Sustainability Report 2010 
9 others members of CSI also made a reporting of 
their performance on some or all of indicators. The 
comparison is based on data from 2009.  
For the frequency rate of occupational lost-time 
accident, the company is ranked 2
nd
 of 7.  
For the severity rate, the company is ranked 7
th
 of 9 
companies.  
To conclude, the company has improved its 
frequency rate, which is often due to a zero accident 
policy, but in the same time, the number of fatal 
accidents has increased. The control of the most frequent 
events, when it is needed, is not sufficient for decreasing 
the effects of accidents. 
Global control of risks must be based on prioritizing 
as regulation is requiring too. When companies want to 
improve EHS
7
 performance [9], they have to define the 
right models and indicators because the top managers 
will then focus on them [10]. Let us remind the 
FRPPHQWVIURP+HUEHUW6LPRQ¶VHFRQRPLF1REHO3UL]H
« the most important resource is not information but the 
awareness of actors ». When top managers are committed 
to safety, we must have relevant indicators to assess the 
efficiency of policies. What is also important is to ask 
oneself as far as possible and as often as possible the 
right questions. Then to understand and act in the right 
direction, as Deming used to say, « Best efforts are not 
enough; you have to know where to go ». 
4 &RQFOXVLRQ 
The various sociotechnical activities need specific 
control system adapted to the stakes and complexity of 
their environment in order to reach their goals. In the 
field of prevention of risks for workers, ethical and 
human issues are paramount. Based on statistics from 
International Labor Organization and Worldwide Health 
Organization [1], we can give the following data. There 
are 2 000 000 fatalities at work each year worldwide 
divided in 1 700 000 fatalities due to occupational 
diseases and 300 000 due to occupational accidents (plus 
268 million lost time accidents  more than 3 days out of 
work).  
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Politics have to develop strong vision and concrete 
policies of prevention to solve this very important 
problem for the whole world. 
When reading various Sustainable Corporate 
Reports [11], we can notice that some companies take 
into account the CFR of outside contractors but this is not 
generalized. To compare companies using widely 
subcontractors in a more relevant way this activity would 
have to be included.  Moreover, in order to use statistics 
properly, we have to be rigorous and do not use data out 
of their context. Indeed to determine if the CFR is ³good 
or not´, it can be useful to know the average of 
companies from the same sector of activity. How can be 
relevant to compare companies from so different sectors 
as construction or pharmaceuticals? 
Then CFR does not demonstrate necessarily the 
existence of direct links with efforts invested in safety 
and health programmes and improvements achieved.  
So CFR is one of the most used indicators of the 
Safety Management System to measure company 
performance but this indicator has got intrinsic limits. It 
must then be used with other indicators that demonstrate 
all together the level of risk control. It should be 
appropriate to put in place other indicators such as the 
participation rate or the measure of efficiency with time 
if we want to demonstrate what makes the system work 
or result indicators such as the measure of the number of 
accidents avoided for instance to show the impact of 
actions. 
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